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Harriman was at the forefront of a number of initiatives, pursuing them with exemplary energy and commitment. Although still a firm advocate of the general principle of 'containment', he felt that the fight for South Vietnam was not worth the damage to American national unity and international prestige. Harriman sought a settlement based on the restoration of the Geneva Accords of 1954, in the context of a broader vision of a non-aligned and economically developed Indochina with underpinned by security guarantees from the United States and other major powers. Drawing on his early diplomatic experiences, Harriman strove persistently to engage Soviet help, but the commitment from Moscow was erratic and ultimately unproductive. While the Soviets sought to continue the post-Cuban Missile Crisis détente and feared the Vietnam War getting out of hand, the likelihood of Soviet assistance was compromised by the intensifying rivalry with communist China. Supporting wars of national liberation was an earnest of ideological integrity in the battle for influence in the communist world.
Harriman experienced only limited progress. When he left office at the beginning of 1969, he was embittered and resentful about the opportunities for peace that Johnson and some of his advisers seemed to have squandered, but it has emerged from communist records that attitudes in Hanoi were at least as much a sticking point as attitudes in the White House. Although North Vietnam agreed to direct contacts in 1968, the intention was to win international sympathy for their cause and exploit public opinion in the United States. The article draws upon Harriman's personal papers as well as transcripts of presidential telephone conversations, White House and State Department memoranda, and CIA assessments. Some of the most recent secondary research is used, too, to shed light on communist attitudes and policies and to highlight some of the latest interpretations of the Vietnam War. The article provides an up-to-date account of the contributions to the diplomacy of Vietnam from one of the most eminent figures in US Cold War diplomacy, adding a new perspective to American involvement in Southeast Asia.
included administering Lend-Lease aid in London 1941-43 and then serving as Ambassador to the Soviet Union until 1945. Harriman has been criticised in the latter role for his limited engagement with the bureaucratic grind of diplomacy and with the ideological subtleties of the Soviet system, 6 but he succeeded all the same in securing regular access to Stalin and other leading officials -not least because the Soviet leader felt that Harriman had in the 1920s tried 'to help the Soviet people'. 7 Harriman was justified in a 1968 statement that 'Not many people have had experience in dealing with senior Russians; no-one saw Stalin more than I'. 8 The Soviet misuse of LendLease assistance and Moscow's brutal attitude to the Warsaw uprising of 1944 led him to advocate a tougher stance towards the Soviet Union, making him an early advocate of containment. 9 In April 1945 he maintained that to avoid 'a world dominated by Soviet policies we must abandon our conciliatory policies and put our reliance on four square policies'. 10 Dean Acheson suggested that Harriman was 'ferocious about the Rouskis' and wanted to 'beat them with any stick he could find ' . 11 Yet while Harriman was no admirer of communism he felt that it was possible to put ideological differences to one side to build a pragmatic relationship with Moscow based on shared interests. 12 Later, as Ambassador in London and then Secretary of Commerce (dealing with the Marshall Plan) under Truman, Harriman furthered American policies in the developing Cold War.
After time as Governor of New York, and after he had engaged in some cajoling, Harriman served in the John F. Kennedy administration, in the roles of Ambassador at Large, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and then Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. 13 The 'Governor' led the US delegation in talks with the Soviets in Geneva over Laos.
14 He regarded the agreement, concluded in 1962 after lengthy talks, providing for Laotian neutrality as an example of how the Soviet Union and the United States could work constructively together in Southeast Asia and beyond. In particular, he believed that he had a 'gentleman's agreement' with Soviet Foreign Minister Georgi Pushkin to the effect that foreign troops would respect Laotian neutrality, 15 contributed to non-proliferation. As well as representing another success in multilateral negotiations, the agreement was an example of Harriman furthering Soviet-American cooperation, although it fell short of the Administration's hope for Soviet guarantees against a Chinese nuclear capability. 16 So far as Vietnam was concerned, Harriman was authorised to talk privately with the North Vietnamese as the Laos negotiations concluded, but in doing so he met with no indication of willingness to compromise. 17 Harriman soon grew concerned about Saigon's failure to win popular support in the face of the mounting communist counterinsurgency, feeling that the American commitment of advisers and material aid would be wasted in the absence of an effective government in South Vietnam. He shared responsibility with Roger Hilsman, Michael Forrestal and George Ball for the infamous telegram to the Saigon embassy on 24 August 1963 suggesting that the United States would stand aside in the even of an attempt to overthrow President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu. Harriman was the strongest advocate of promoting a coup in the administration, 18 although recent research has indicated that responsibility for the demise of Diem and his brother was well-diffused throughout the administration, so that the circle of culpability included President Kennedy. 19 All the same, Harriman and his associates were Washington's prime movers in relation to initiating the coup. They had assumed that Diem and Nhu would suffer a fate no worse than exile or house arrest, so the murder of the two men came as a deep shock. Successive regimes in Saigon failed to establish themselves, in part because the Viet Cong encouraged and exploited the instability by intensifying their guerrilla campaign.
By the time of John F. Kennedy's assassination a few weeks after the South Vietnam coup, there were some 16,000 American 'advisers' in Vietnam, many times the number present since the beginning of 1961. Harriman considered that Kennedy's increasing of the number of US advisers flowed inexorably from the decisions of the Eisenhower administration, 20 which had supported the French military effort against the communists and then after the Geneva conference of 1954 extended growing support to preserve South Vietnam against the communist insurgency. There is evidence that at the time Harriman supported those decisions. In a 1954 discussion with former Truman officials, he was the most vigorous advocate of intervention, ruing the possibility of 'abandoning the whole of Southeast Asia'. 21 More than likely Harriman's view derived in large part from the expediency of criticising the Republicans at a time when he felt that the administration might not pursue the commitment Vietnam. Later he would blame the Eisenhower administration for doing the very thing he had advocated, that is, backing the Saigon regime; he would argue 4 that an irrevocable commitment to Vietnam had been made. Harriman 29 Harriman was touchy about his diminished status in the new administration, 30 yet served Johnson faithfully and professionally all the same. He had genuine and lasting respect for the President's 'superlative record' on domestic affairs 'which outachieved Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy put together'. 31 McGeorge Bundy noted that Harriman was 'fanatically loyal to the President', and sought 'nothing more than to be President Johnson's most effective diplomatic instrument'. 32 Harriman worked hard to fulfil his African responsibilities, with affairs in the Congo proving especially time-consuming. After gaining independence from Belgium in 1962 the country appeared to be on the verge of tribal civil war. Harriman was aggrieved when at a critical point George Ball was appointed over his head as a troubleshooter. He complained that 'I was told to take care of Africa, and then every important decision is taken out of my hands'. 33 Harriman did not pursue any radical departures in policy in Africa, seeing the continent in large part through Cold War lenses. He noted with satisfaction in 1964 that 'Not a single new African nation has succumbed to Communist domination'.
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Escalation in Vietnam
Although concerned mainly with African affairs at this stage, Harriman still had some involvement with Southeast Asia, where he proved willing to endorse the use of punitive violence. In a meeting about Laos with Johnson and other advisers in June 1964, he supported an air-strike on a Pathet Lao anti-aircraft battery after the destruction of a US reconnaissance plane. Harriman was probably the most aggressive of those assembled, expressing his determination to 'convey a message' about American resolve to Hanoi. 35 Laos was an issue of particular sensitivity for Harriman, given his central role in the 1962 settlement. He also endorsed punitive violence in relation to the somewhat ambiguous North Vietnam 'attacks' in the Gulf of Tonkin on the US destroyers Maddox and the C. 6 that the air-strikes on North Vietnam won 'the respect of many countries by the determination shown, and the acquiescence of others who are reserving judgment'.
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Soon after an attack on an American base at Pleiku in February 1965, the administration initiated the sustained 'Rolling Thunder' air campaign and authorised the first wave of US combat troops in Vietnam. Harriman did not play a role in the critical deliberations in Washington in spring 1965 about expanding the US commitment in Vietnam; that task was confined largely to the 'awesome foursome' of Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy. 38 As with Kennedy, Harriman was never inclined to blame Johnson for the Vietnam disaster. The nearest he came to doing so was to suggest that the President had wrongly been 'sold the idea that it was his duty to fight Vietnam through', 39 by advisers such as Dean Rusk and by the military. 40 Generally, in committing the United States to a combat role in Vietnam Johnson is seen as having made bad decisions without questioning his underlying assumptions, although it is acknowledged that he had a healthy fear of precipitating the Third World War and that he took advice from a wide range of sources, 41 beyond just his immediate advisers.
By early 1968 there were over half a million American soldiers in Vietnam. Victory was proving elusive, with the American public losing patience, and the political climate on the US growing increasingly fractured. One of Harriman's concerns as the US fighting role in Vietnam expanded was 'the deep division' that developed 'among the American people'. This fostered an 'attitude of isolationism which would cripple us in dealing with future world problems in other areas'. He was also concerned about the loss of American prestige … Before Viet-Nam, the US was the standard bearer of moral principle in world affairs. This was being greatly shattered by Viet-Nam because of the people's misunderstanding of the issues, or perhaps the arrogant manner in which we were going it alone. 42 As the reality of the United States' open-ended combat commitment in Vietnam set in, the idea of negotiating a peace became all the more attractive to Harriman. He spent less time delineating a possible settlement than he did trying to initiate talks, but the outlines of what he sought are evident from his memoranda and statements. He considered that a restoration of the Geneva Accords of 1954, in conjunction with honouring the Geneva Accords of 1962 in Laos, would provide the best foundation for peace (it seems that he did not advocate holding the elections in Vietnam that were proposed as part of the 1954 settlement). 43 Harriman also thought beyond the Geneva Accords, seeing the potential of Indochina as a non-aligned area with its security guaranteed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other major powers. 44 troops, anti-aircraft artillery troops, and military and civil material, 45 there was a historic rivalry between Vietnam and China, stemming from how the Chinese had over the millennia tried to control the people on their periphery. Hanoi newspapers published articles about the heroic resistance of Vietnamese fighters to invaders from the North. 46 Harriman considered that Ho Chi Minh, the leader of North Vietnam, was primarily an 'Asian Tito' rather than a communist expansionist. 47 Hanoi would have a material and political interest in preserving the settlement -after his experience with Hanoi's exploitation of Laos as a transit route into South Vietnam Harriman had concluded that 'the North will never abide by any settlement unless they feel it is in their interest to do so'. 48 Harriman's vision of a Vietnam pacified by regional development was not entirely novel; in a speech at Johns Hopkins University in April 1965 President Johnson said he was willing to ask Congress for a billion dollars to develop the Mekong River. The administration sponsored the creation of the Asian Development Bank in 1965, but its establishment did nothing to ease the conflict in Vietnam. There were difficulties realising the development of Southeast Asia. For a start, the region's potential for economic development would not be easy to realise, with its language differences and the absence of complementary economies.
49 So far as Vietnam was concerned, Ho's suspicions of communist China can be exaggerated. A recent analysis has suggested that while Ho 'had a special affection for Vietnam's people and favoured Vietnam's unification and independence … he firmly adhered to the Leninist principle that Communist nations should subordinate their interests to those of the international Communist movement.' 50 Harriman considered that communist China might be among those states supporting a non-aligned Indochina. Yet it was ideologically opportune for China to support the North Vietnamese in their war of national liberation -not least because of the developing rivalry with Moscow. 51 Sino-American relations were in a frosty and rigid state with the US refusing to extend diplomatic recognition to communist China and with vituperative anti-American rhetoric emanating from Beijing. This situation clearly did not favour Chinese cooperation with the establishment and maintenance of a non-aligned Indochina. However, Harriman did recognise some of the difficulties, with him suggesting a two China policy in the UN. 52 This would represent at least the beginning of a more constructive engagement, with the opportunity for a dialogue of equals. Whatever the limits of his vision, Harriman felt it essential from 1965 to try to 45 
Ambassador at Large, Again
Early in 1965 -in response to promptings from Harriman -Thomas Mann argued that although Harriman was 'garrulous and vain, he understands the commies and he understands power and the importance of power'. The President 'could use him … to look around the world and come up with ideas' in relation to Vietnam.
53 Soon Harriman was re-appointed to the role of Ambassador at Large (one of the positions he had occupied under JFK), with special responsibility for Vietnam. Johnson anticipated that he could 'go from capital to capital by 707' to investigate the possibility of negotiating an end to the war. 54 Harriman was delighted at having secured the appointment, with his friend Arthur Schlesinger Jr remarking that he 'sees the Vietnam negotiation as the climax of his public career'. 55 
56 Although the Stalin era was long gone, Harriman's name was still respected in Moscow. He was able to regale Soviet officials with stories of his meetings with Lenin and Stalin, figures who they knew only from legends and history books. 57 Harriman was well versed in what was going on in Vietnam; US Ambassador in London David Bruce once noted that he spoke with 'habitual lucidity about problems in the Far East'. 58 Finally, Harriman's position as a liberal was another qualification for his new post.
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The appointment was entirely a marriage of convenience for the President, given how recently he had expressed a wish to belittle Harriman. At the same time, there are doubts about whether the President took the peacemaking role seriously (it is telling that he appointed someone who he judged 'old and dead' to the role). Other than Harriman's status as the man 'in charge of peace', the mandate was imprecise, 60 and -as will be seen below -the public relations dimension of the appointment was a driving concern for Johnson.
61 Although an informal 'Negotiations Committee' comprising Harriman and half a dozen or so State Department officials was established, giving Harriman more status in the bureaucracy, 62 he was only a rare presence at the important 'Tuesday Lunch' policy discussions. 63 one, the withdrawal of US forces, two, an end to the existing regime in South Vietnam, and, three, the latter's replacement with a coalition government to include pro-communist and pro-Hanoi representatives. Hanoi had little hope for a satisfactory diplomatic settlement, recalling how the talks in Geneva in 1954 had led to continued foreign involvement in Vietnam. After the US escalation in 1965 the leadership of North Vietnam was determined to preserve the revolutionary effort and to avoid negotiating an end to a war they could win without compromise on the battlefield. As such, the only diplomatic settlement that Hanoi was willing to accept amounted to an American capitulation. The North Vietnamese had Chinese support in their approach. 64 Harriman saw merit in enlisting Soviet help. A US intelligence report summarised Moscow's policy as 'supplying military aid' to the North, 'playing down their own involvement, and seeking opportunities to urge the US and North Vietnamese to negotiate'. 65 The latter was not much in evidence when in July 1965 managed in July 1965 to inveigle an invitation to Moscow under cover of a sightseeing visit. The idea was to engage Soviet help in the search for a settlement, but Chairman Alexei Kosygin told Harriman that the United States should talk directly to Hanoi about the possibility of a negotiated peace. 66 He firmly disputed Harriman's depiction of what was going on in Vietnam, leading Harriman to complain that even Stalin had not questioned his good faith. 67 Generally, Kosygin was deeply impatient with the United States, having been in Hanoi at the time of the communist attack on the US base at Pleiku (about which he had no prior warning) and the subsequent US punitive strikes on North Vietnam. 68 Evidence has emerged recently that after his visit to Hanoi Kosygin had visited Beijing to try to coordinate help to North Vietnam, but the discussion had been acrimonious, with the Chinese berating the Soviet Union for consorting with the Americans. The Soviets now trod especially warily in advising Hanoi to negotiate, fearing charges that they were sacrificing North Vietnamese interests while looking after their own.
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Vietnam Advisers (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993), especially pp.172-89, on the advisory system and decision-making. 64 70 Harriman told Chancellor Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany that Kosygin was 'a hardened Communist and believes that Communism will be victorious ... through wars of national liberation'. 71 Nevertheless he derived some satisfaction when Kosygin mentioned 'the retention of the 17th parallel'. This implied some form of recognition for South Vietnam, which previously the Soviets had resisted. 72 Harriman soon made further efforts in the pursuit of peace. In August 1965, he worked with Yugoslav President Josep Tito, feeling that he 'might be induced to exert his influence on Moscow to persuade the Soviets to take greater initiative with Hanoi to come to the negotiating table'. 73 However, little came of any such efforts. The next of Harriman's Vietnam enterprises was more sustained, involving a diplomatic peace offensive at the end of 1965 and the beginning of 1966. Presidential aide Joe Califano suggested to Johnson 'a dramatic peace gesture', to include 'the trip of Averell Harriman to various capitals of the world'. 74 At the very least, the effort would demonstrate a commitment to a negotiated settlement, and might actually bring peace. 75 The President suggested to Harriman:
If you don't mind picking up your old kit bags, going to visit your old friend Tito … see if he has any channels, go to Poland -just quietly, one of your general vacationing around, the elder statesman visiting around the world to see the state of the world, then probably get in to see that Hungarian Foreign Minister, you can go to Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, any place you drop in or out.
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It is clear that the 'old kit bags' initiative was as much an example of spontaneous improvisation as sustained forethought and planning. Harriman found that his flight to Poland had not even been cleared with the Polish authorities. Fortunately, the limited preparation did not stop him from seeing leaders not only in Poland but also in Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, Iran, the United Arab Republic, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and Japan. A number of other US officials -including VicePresident Hubert Humphrey -travelled abroad, too, while Dean Rusk made supporting efforts with foreign representatives in Washington.
To support the peace campaign the administration halted the bombing of North Vietnam. Harriman once stated that strategic bombing was of little value, with him having seen how in London during the Second World War the efforts of the Luftwaffe had bolstered rather than eroded British resolve. 77 However, he also told Ambassador Bruce that maintaining the bombing in Vietnam was essential to any prospect of bringing the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. 78 As with his support of punitive attacks in Laos and Vietnam in 1964, it is clear that he was willing to wield a big stick as well as to walk softly. The latter was evident in how Harriman felt that occasional pauses in the bombing would help to encourage the communists to come to the negotiating table by showing that the United States was willing to make concessions. However, bombing halts were less of a concession than Harriman appeared to realise. It was noted in relation to the 1965-66 pause that 'the aircraft are doing their job elsewhere, the weather is bad over North Vietnam this month anyway, reconnaissance continues over North Vietnam', and 'if no progress is made towards peace, we can catch up later in the North'.
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All the same, Harriman urged extending this pause, which had begun at the beginning of January, to the end of the Vietnamese new year, 23 January, on the grounds that 'the importance of gaining the support of governments and worldwide public opinion' outweighed any military disadvantages of extending the pause. 80 Harriman was vigorous in making his case, with Bundy noting that he 'fires all his arguments at us'. 81 Generally, representatives of the State Department (with Rusk as a notable exception) favoured extending the pause. Undersecretary of State George Ball, for example, maintained that resuming air attacks raised the prospect of Chinese intervention. 82 However, the military feared that Hanoi was stealing an advantage on the battlefield, and therefore sought to maintain the pressure on North Vietnam'. 83 Finally, the advocates of a longer pause prevailed, with an extension to 31 January, even longer than Harriman had requested. By this time he felt satisfied that the communists had had enough time to respond.
Overall, Harriman had thrown his weight behind the peace offensive wholeheartedly. His verdict was that allies and neutrals now 'recognize[d] the President's sincerity' in the pursuit of peace. 84 His assistant Chester Cooper had positive view, too, suggesting that Harriman's time abroad was 'the most productive of all those undertaken', 85 while the US Ambassador in Tokyo suggested that his 'stopover' had brought 'psychological benefits' for American standing exceeding 'anything else we've done about Vietnam for the past year'. 86 At the same time, the peace offensive had obviously not brought talks with Hanoi, in part because the 'three-ring circus' publicity surrounding the campaign may have been counterproductive. 87 As with the very appointment of Harriman as 'ambassador for peace', there was the question of whether the White House's initiation of the 1965-66 peace offensive was an authentic effort to foster negotiations or if its main purpose was to improve public perceptions of the Administration at home and abroad. 88 It is telling that an internal document described the campaign as the 'peace punch to go 79 Draft paper, 18 December 1965 , FRUS 1964 86 Johnson to Harriman, 19 January 1966, enclosing report from US Embassy Tokyo, Box 548, AHP. 87 Cooper, Lost Crusade, p.296. To be fair, Harriman had himself felt that quiet diplomacy could be more effective, with him resisting another trek to Moscow on the grounds that the Soviet leadership 'might be willing to do something quietly but not otherwise'. Quoted in Dumbrell, Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism, p.108. 88 Cooper, Lost Crusade, 292. with the military punch which is coming in January'. Johnson needed to show 'determination to move toward peace' before, as was a likelihood, the American people could be asked to make sacrifices such as increased taxes. 89 The North Vietnamese had no doubt about the sincerity of the 'peace punch', rejecting it as nothing more than a 'sham'.
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The Romanian Channel
In August 1967, Harriman reflected on his recent work. The United States had 'made many efforts -directly and through third parties, public and private -to move towards a political settlement in Vietnam'. He and his colleagues had 'put forward many proposals and have instituted four bombing pauses'. In December and January 1966-67 'we were in contact with the North Vietnamese in Moscow'. 91 There was no response by February, when the President sent a personal letter to Ho Chi Minh, only to receive a sharp note in reply. Ho insisted that there could be no talks unless the United States stopped the bombing and ended all reinforcements during the talks. Harriman did not mention one of the most noted of the peace initiatives, the 'Marigold' channel through Poland and Italy -presumably because much of the toing and froing was down to his staff. The Marigold channel had originated in Harriman's trip to Warsaw at the end of 1965. In an interview when he was out of office, he suggested that although Polish Foreign Minister Jerzy Michalowski 'felt that if we'd held the pause for a little longer period they [North Vietnam] might have come around', Johnson had in fact given 'ample time' with the pause, '37 days in all'. It seemed that 'the government in Hanoi was not ready to negotiate at that time'.
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In January-February 1967 'we were in close touch with the Wilson-Kosygin conversations' in London 'and hoped that these would produce something of value'. discussions. 95 Hopes crashed when hardliners (notably National Security Adviser Walt Rostow) in Washington reversed the formula at the eleventh hour, leaving Wilson, Kosygin and Bruce high and dry. Among other things, the debacle could hardly have bolstered Moscow's already qualified enthusiasm for negotiations.
Harriman was especially involved in the so-called 'Packers' channel from October 1967 to February 1968 involving the North Vietnamese and the Romanian governments. After visiting Washington at the end of September, Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer was impressed that 'the primary US goal was to enable the South Vietnamese people to determine their own destiny and that the President desired a peaceful solution'. 96 Maurer spoke along these lines to the North Vietnamese in Hanoi. With assistance from his deputy Marcovescu he also elaborated on the San Antonio formula, which Johnson had presented in September. It resembled the Phase-A-Phase B formula that the British had used earlier that year. Finally, by the end of January there was no indication that the North Vietnamese were willing to consider the San Antonio formula. 97 The Romanians had, according to one analysis, 'committed high-level attention and time to the effort of December 1967-February 1968, and impressed all US officials who talked with them the accuracy of their reporting and the persistence of their efforts'. Yet the channel had its limitations. Another analysis suggested that the Romanians 'may have exaggerated the extent of their independence from the Soviets during this exercise' as Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington told Harriman that 'the Romanians always informed Moscow first of its planned moves'. 98 This implied that the Soviets -perhaps chastened by the Phase A-B affair -had poured cold water on the effort.
Talks about Talks
Late in 1967 and early in 1968 there were a series of meetings in Washington in wish the advisory group known as the 'Wise Men' -establishment luminaries such as Dean Acheson, Arthur Dean and Douglas Dillon -came to doubt the possibility of victory in Vietnam and advocated an end to the war. Harriman did not participate in the 'Wise Men' meetings, but he joined them in advocating an end to the war. He pushed for moving into negotiations rapidly and urged a full bombing halt. 99 The representations influenced the President. In a dramatic public address on 31 March 1968, Johnson stated that he did not seek another term in the White House, and he announced a renewed willingness to negotiate. Albeit in the context of a lengthy anti-American diatribe, Hanoi responded to the olive branch by expressing a readiness to 'send its representatives to make contact with US representatives to decide with the US side the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other war acts against the DRV of it. In 1969 President Richard Nixon noted how Harriman, along with Ambassadors Charles Bohlen and Llewellyn Thompson, had maintained that 'the Soviet Union could do nothing as long as the United States was bombing a fellow Socialist country, and that it would be very active afterwards'. Yet even when the bombing stopped at the end of October the Soviet Union did 'nothing', other than helping to settle the protracted question of the shape of the negotiating table. 121 Harriman would have been dismayed to have known that some of his colleagues made a point of concealing their own dealings with Soviet officials from him. In October, Walt Rostow, whose suspicions of Harriman remained unalloyed, wrote to Dobrynin saying that the President 'could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace'. It was also essential that South Vietnam should be able to participate in any substantive talks. Rostow, and Dean Rusk, considered it essential that Harriman remained ignorant of these exchanges with Dobrynin, or 'he would resign'. 122 Of course, there was nothing new in what Rostow had said, but Harriman was much more disposed to ending the bombing as a means of facilitating substantive talks than was Rostow, and, as has been noted, he had less of a commitment to the regime in South Vietnam.
Missed Opportunities?
Later, a frustrated Harriman argued that there were several missed opportunities for peace in 1968. In part these missed opportunities demonstrated how the administration was split between those who like Harriman wanted to reduce military operations and those who like Rostow and Rusk were reluctant to make any concessions for fear that the communists would take military advantage. The first of Harriman's alleged opportunities occurred in June, when Alexei Kosygin wrote to Johnson to say that North Vietnam was willing to negotiate seriously for a peaceful settlement if the bombing of North Vietnam stopped. The President, Harriman and other officials met to discuss the matter. Harriman maintained that 'This is an extremely important letter…. This could be a breakthrough.' He had the support of Clark Clifford, but Dean Rusk was more sceptical, pointing out that 'It would be costly to start bombing and restart it.' Similarly, Maxwell Taylor describing the letter as 'a bear trap'. 123 Harriman blamed Rusk in particular for missing the chance 'to get the Soviet Government on the hook in a way that would be most valuable in future negotiations'. 124 The Secretary of State had long been a target for Harriman's hostility -he once remarked that the 'crafty' and 'Machiavellian' Rusk had 'done more damage to America than anyone in our time'. 125 The latter told Harriman that there had only been 'one or two elliptical efforts to suggest [the communists] have deescalated the fighting on the ground' and that 'we would … be silly if we proceeded on the theory that the other side had made a political decision to deescalate the violence only to find ourselves confronted with new and major attacks which are now in prospect'. 126 In Harriman's eyes, Rusk had again undermined the efforts in Paris. 127 The third of the missed opportunities also took place in July. Harriman sent Vance to Washington to present the views of the negotiating team in Paris in the runup to Johnson's visit to Honolulu to confer with President Thieu of South Vietnam. Vance had also wanted to attend the conference, but did not receive an invitation. 128 The conference communiqué affirmed that Saigon 'should be a full participant playing a leading role' in negotiations, which did much to buttress Thieu's stature. Thieu, who had feared sacrifice by the Americans, is said to have confided later that 'he had gotten more out of Johnson than he had dared hope for'. 129 Harriman lamented the 'hard line communiqué which … set us back again in Paris'. 130 He considered that Rusk, Rostow and White House adviser Abe Fortas had 'motivated the President, or put in the oar to encourage it'.
131 President Thieu's attitude became especially evident a few months later. When on 31 October Johnson announced that the United States was to cease bombing and that four-party talks were imminent, Thieu said that he would not send a team to Paris. 132 Thieu's self-assurance was boosted by intimations from the Nixon campaign team, who assured him that he would obtain better terms from them. Harriman was furious, urging Johnson to go ahead with the talks without Thieu. 133 The last of Harriman's missed opportunities related to Vietnam as an issue in US politics. 134 While on 31 March Johnson had announced his decision not to run for the Presidency and that he was taking steps towards negotiation and de-escalation in Vietnam, he was determined to stand firm, and he resented the peace faction in his party. His wrath extended to Democratic candidate Vice-President Humphrey, who wanted to see a halt to the bombing. Harriman argued that the President should have stopped the air campaign 'about three weeks before the Democratic Convention' in Chicago in August. Given the Vice-President's obvious association with the policies of the administration, ending the bombing would have helped to unify the party, with the result that 'Humphrey would have been nominated without conflict over the plank on Vietnam … and would have started a campaign in which he would have been elected comfortably'. 135 In October the President was roused to fury at how Harriman and George Ball had contributed to a Humphrey speech about Vietnam. The speech was too soft for the President's liking. Harriman was 'a damned fool' who had been 'playing politics … we can't have people working for us that are … breaking out to the nation speeches that neither the Secretary of State nor the President know anything about'. Johnson even considered recalling Harriman from Paris, 136 but his anger soon subsided.
After Nixon's victory in November the Communists were reluctant to deal with the lame-duck Johnson White House. The first substantive meeting was held just after Johnson had left office. Harriman considered that President Thieu had 'sabotaged the talks from the very outset', with covert encouragement from the Nixon team after the November 1968 election. 137 A CIA official noted that Harriman was 'frustrated and disappointed at leaving the Paris talks in such an inconclusive state'. 138 Yet he did not feel that his efforts had been entirely in vain -direct talks had at least begun, and a precedent therefore established. He considered that the Nixon administration had inherited very favourable prospects for a negotiated peace, including an agreement for 'the ending of the bombing to be followed immediately by substantive peace talks between the four parties'. The United States was in a strong position 'since it had over one-half million men in South Vietnam'. However, the legacy was squandered, according to Harriman: the policy of Vietnamisation -turning the war over to the South Vietnamese while withdrawing American forces -rested on the faulty premise that 'the South Vietnamese could accomplish without 500,000 Americans what they could not accomplish without them'. 139 Defenders of Nixon have noted that the South Vietnamese army managed to repulse the spring offensive of 1972, while critics have argued that US airpower was central to the victory. Generally, the South Vietnamese army was largely beyond redemption, due to inefficiency, corruption, poor morale and a lack of national identity. Furthermore, the South Vietnamese regarded the reduction of American troops and the turning over the war to them as a cop-out. 140 The last American troops would leave Vietnam in 1973, and after a rapid military campaign the communists took over the entire peninsula two years later.
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other well-meaning people can live peaceably'.presented has indicated that the failure to achieve peace lay in large part with North Vietnam rather than with Harriman. President Johnson was probably not far off the mark when he said in May 1968 that 'There is no evidence that the North Vietnamese will negotiate seriously. They will do no more than remain in Paris to talk rather than negotiate until the next Administration takes over.'
148 Even then, concessions would be very hard to achieve for the Nixon administration. 149 Like Nixon and Kissinger, Harriman sought an international solution to the problem of Vietnam, although he placed more emphasis on regional economic development and instead of relying on the developing Sino-Soviet split to engage communist China he looked towards Moscow. He considered that a peace agreement could 'only be reached with Moscow's help … the Soviet Union wants a Southeast Asia non-aligned to check China's advance'. 150 Moscow rued the open military struggle between the United States and North Vietnam, which threatened to undermine the post-Cuban Missile Crisis Soviet-American détente. Soviet leaders feared the conflict spreading to other areas, even developing into an East-West confrontation. 151 Yet Moscow's commitment to a negotiated peace was never clearcut, given how the struggle in Vietnam was a classic war of national liberation. 152 Support for North Vietnam in this context was seen as a touchstone of ideological integrity, above all in the context of the ideological rivalry with China. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow suggested that the Soviets 'did not want to take the blame for any settlement that would be acceptable to us, as this would greatly enhance the standing of the Chinese Communists in the whole area at their expense'. 153 During the summer of 1965, Moscow responded to Chinese criticisms by emphasising to socialists across the world that the Soviet Union had recently 'undertaken a series of steps [aimed] at the intensification of aid to the Vietnamese people for the struggle against the imperialist aggressors of the US'. 154 From Moscow's perspective, there were even advantages to permitting the war to continue, in that the widespread opposition to US involvement in Vietnam provided opportunities for Soviet propaganda and diplomacy to undermine American influence in other areas. 155 Furthermore, the war created the opportunity to test their weaponry and to examine captured American arms. 156 Yet the Soviet angle had to be explored thoroughly, and Harriman -given his background dealing with Soviet officials -was just the man. He demonstrated prodigious energy and commitment in relation to trying cultivate Soviet help, and more generally, in his efforts to secure peace in Vietnam. While for Harriman, the American military engagement in Vietnam was (to paraphrase Talleyrand) a blunder
